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3 October 1975

TALKING PAPER FOR GENERAL WILSON

SUBJECT: USIB Discussion of Strategic Warning Staff
Monthly Report

1. As you recall the SWS Monthly Report was designed to sensitize the community to foreign developments that have strategic warning implications..

--The first publication was in March of this year, and the reference issue we are using today is dated 25 September, the seventh to be published.

--In the future we hope to include the SWS Monthly Report on the USIB agenda as often as possible.

2. In a prior review, the consensus was that too much attention was paid to so-called "small w" warning areas.

--This approach seems to have diminished in recent publications. Some overlap is no doubt unavoidable but does not appear excessive in this report.

--This latest issue, like the one in August, is a good report and should be commended for its focus on strategic warning.

3. Last month we prepared some recommendations for USIB discussion of the August issue--in hopes of improving

SECRET

SECRET

the format of the Monthly Report.

--Unfortunately USIB was canceled and, taking advantage of good intelligence, the SWS was able to incorporate our "leaked" suggestions into the September issue. Specifically we think that the additions of both the introductory note on the title page and the byline are beneficial to the customer.

4. We would also like to note that some months back the SWS was experimenting with a means of conveying a "temperature reading" of strategic warning indicators.

--The chart in this current report (opposite page 13), on the likelihood of North Korean instigated hostilities, is an excellent beginning.

--We would encourage continued efforts of this nature-- perhaps, for example, the development of a technique to convey changes in the level of the overall strategic threat to the United States.

5. Although not directly related to the SWS Monthly Report, I would like to mention that I plan to convene a meeting of the Strategic Warning Review Group in the near future to discuss SWS operations.

--This is a fallout from DCID 1/5 which stipulates that the D/DCI/IC is assigned the responsibility for a working group to review the strategic warning process.

SECRET

SECRET

--The names of your representatives have been provided to me, and they will be notified later as to the details.

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SECRET

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR GENERAL WILSON

SUBJECT: Lack of Personnel Support to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)

Manning for SWS.

1. In DCID No. 1/5 (attached), dated 26 FEB 75, one of the responsibilities of USIB departments and agencies in support of the SWS is "to provide full-time, senior professional intelligence personnel to the SWS and other support as arranged by the Special Assistant."

2. According to a 3 MAR 75 memorandum from MG Faurer to the D/DCI/IC, a staff of ten analysts was to be formed. To date only DIA (2), NSA (2), CIA (2), and Air Force (1) have provided the requested number of analysts. DIA and CIA have also provided additional personnel for administrative support. State Department, Army, and Navy were asked to provide one analyst each, but none have as yet been assigned.

Reasons for lack of personnel support.

3. State. Mr. Hyland has expressed interest in filling the quota. State personnel have visited the SWS facilities to check on its operations, but no one has expressed a desire to accept the job.

4. Navy. Although Navy continues to say it is looking for someone to fill its quota, no one has been assigned.

5. Army. MG Aaron has stated that Army does not intend to provide a full-time analyst. He claims to have already provided the disbanded National Indications Center with Army personnel that have--over the years--been absorbed within DIA. Thus, he feels DIA should fill the Army slot. General Aaron has indicated that an analyst on the ACSI staff would be made available on a liaison basis. Aaron's position is complicated; [redacted] can provide you with the details if you wish.

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